

The Honorable Birch Bayh
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed for the use of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is a comprehensive study on "US Capabilities to Monitor the SALT II Treaty." I hope that this Interagency Intelligence Memorandum will be of use to the Committee in connection with the ratification proceedings. I look forward to supplementing this report in direct testimony before you.

The report has two aspects:

First, it contains detailed technical analyses of our monitoring capabilities prepared by our best experts in each of the relevant areas. These analyses consider how well our intelligence apparatus can perform with respect to particular parameters under specific circumstances. Our monitoring judgments are probably conservative. They do not, for instance, take into account the possibility of unusual or unpredictable intelligence successes or fortuitous errors by the Soviets. In many cases the Soviets would probably appraise the risks of detection higher than our estimates of our confidence.

Second, this report also contains intelligence evaluations of how the Soviets might weigh the risks and benefits of attempting to cheat. Some of the cheating scenarios in the study are improbable, but are

theoretically feasible and are included for completeness. This thoroughness is necessary to ensure proper assessment of our intelligence apparatus so as to ensure early warning of ambiguous activity.

Let me also note that if we were to assume that the Soviets might attempt several cheating programs simultaneously, our judgments would be quite different. Simply stated, the chance of detecting the fact of cheating rises rapidly if several cheating programs are being pursued simultaneously.

This report, of course, does not address the question of the adequacy of verification. Making that judgment involves other considerations which are outside the purview of the Intelligence Community. For example, two of these factors--the significance to the US of potential violations and our capability to take appropriate and timely countermeasures--will be discussed by the Secretaries of State and Defense when testifying on the question of verification.

In sum, I offer this study as an Intelligence Community workbook which treats only the monitoring of this Treaty and the prospects for cheating--it is not a comprehensive treatment of all aspects of the adequacy of verification.

I stand ready to amplify on this report or be of assistance in any other way.

Yours sincerely,

STANSFIELD TURNER